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‘Land to the foreigners’: economic, legal, and socio-cultural aspects of
new land acquisition schemes in Ethiopia
Jon Abbink*
African Studies Centre, Leiden
The Ethiopian government is an active partner in the general trend in Africa to
hand out large tracts of land to foreign companies and governments for big
commercial farming in order to enhance national development and growing
energy needs. Projected enclave enterprises take off on lands of low density and
use but often inhabited or used by a variety of local peoples that have no legal title
to their land, despite their customary and usufruct rights, because all land in
Ethiopia is state property (since 1975). The economic impact of these enterprises
(export crop farms, biofuel enterprises) is expected to be mainly on the national
level (land lease fee income, export product growth), and to a lesser extent on that
of the regional governments.
While there are precedents to these land deals in Ethiopia, doling out local
lands without much consultation of local inhabitants or land users (e.g. in the
large-scale resettlement schemes and state farms), this time the controversy is
augmented by insecurity about long-term ecological and food security effects and
the generation of friction and counter-discourses that will make the schemes foci
of conflict. National territory  ‘the motherland’  and culturally significant
locations are also being leased out, threatening social systems and cultural
identities of local groups. Apart from the issue of food insecurity effects,
economic dependency on foreign sources may increase. Nationalist issues thus
may mingle with social, economic, and cultural heritage issues in emerging
concerns on the large-scale leases. Critical discourse and protest on this topic is
discouraged by the authorities. The paper will discuss a number of arguments in
this debate, comment on some incipient large-scale land acquisition projects, and
sketch a research agenda, focusing on the legal and social issues.
Keywords: large-scale land leases; Ethiopia; political economy; rural develop-
ment; food (in) security; cultural rights
‘‘Far more valuable than gold is a particle of Ethiopia’s earth.’’
Emperor Tewodos II of Ethiopia, 18681
‘‘Come and farm our virgin lands, Ethiopia tells India’’
Press statement, Hindu Times 26 May 20112
Introduction3
Ethiopia is one of the countries where large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) by
foreign parties, facilitated by the central government, are very evident. A host of
issues emerges when observing this new phenomenon, which has potential for
*Email: abbink@ascleiden.nl
Journal of Contemporary African Studies
Vol. 29, No. 4, October 2011, 513535
ISSN 0258-9001 print/ISSN 1469-9397 online
# 2011 The Institute of Social and Economic Research
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2011.603213
http://www.tandfonline.com
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 00
:48
 18
 A
pri
l 2
01
2 
economic development as well as for friction and controversy. Critics speak of ‘land
grabbing’, and although polemical this metaphor is not entirely without justification:
currently foreign actors feel a need to get a good share and ‘not to come too late’.
It is, however, a process whereby the national governments, in Ethiopia and in Africa
in general, are active partners. The aim is investment, agrarian expansion, developing
alternative energy sources, and overall economic growth. Local populations, often
the traditional custodians of the land and practicing age-old use rights, are rarely
a partner in the deals (cf. Nierenberg & Ridberg 2010). This problem is common in
Africa (cf. Madagascar, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania or Ghana4), and the extent of the
economic and ecological, but also the social and cultural problems that may result is
only barely in sight.
The title of this paper comes from a South Ethiopian farmer, who told me
in August 2009: ‘In the past, when we had the Derg [the 197491 military-socialist
government], we heard the promise: ‘‘land to the tiller’’, that slogan which they took
over from the students. And we got access to land-but not to the ownership of it.
Now the government gives the land to the foreigners. We do not understand this
thing . . . . What will become of us? What are our rights to the land we know? Will we
have to move out or learn farming from them? How? This is all new and we don’t
know what it will bring.’5
Here we see the irony of history at work: the revolutionary Ethiopian
student movement of the 1970s, when agitating for socialist reform of Ethiopian
agriculture then dominated by private, unequal land ownership, absentee land-
lordism and massive poverty of the peasant rural producers, pleaded for empowering
the local farmers by giving them full access to the land they cultivated. In April 1975,
one year after the Ethiopian revolution, the Derg, which had some radical student
advisors, basically took over their idea: all land was nationalised and ownership was
vested in the state (cf. Clapham 1988, 151, 161; Yeraswork 2000, 19193, 208f.). This
far-reaching socialist measure led to the disappearance of the old land-owning
classes and traditional power holders. It gave peasants access to land via use rights
but, however, not ownership. The solution for Ethiopia’s agrarian crisis was
not sought in the creative release of the farmers’ own productive energies, which
could have been realised by giving them a real stake in the land as owners and
making them independent producers. No durable agricultural growth was achieved
in the Derg period, because the lack of property and transfer rights seriously limited
the farmers’ commitment to produce and invest (Yeraswork 2000). In addition, the
state-led Agricultural Marketing Corporation forced them to produce and sell its
quota of certain crops in return for low prices.
In Ethiopia the foreign LSLAs were allowed since c. 2007 as part of the policy to
boost agricultural development, and the country joined the ranks of many other,
especially African, countries giving out the land on a large scale, a trend that
emerged in the wake of the global food price crisis and the surge of demand for
‘bio-fuels’, such as jatropha oil, sugar cane and castor bean oil.6 In 2009, 67% of
the total foreign land acquisitions in the world were made in Africa. One could speak
of a ‘new scramble for Africa’  a rush by rich countries to get as much land as
possible and not ‘stay behind’, motivated by the wish to secure future food supply
sources. The term ‘scramble’ finds additional justification when we see the haste, the
lack of negotiation about conditions, the privileging of foreigners over locals, and
514 J. Abbink
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 00
:48
 18
 A
pri
l 2
01
2 
when we know that c. 70% of the land thus far acquired is not (yet) taken into
production (in 2010).
The Ethiopian government gives out these large surfaces of the country for
foreign commercial farming and defines it as investment for development, in line
with an ambitious energy policy.7 As of 2009, Ethiopia had 406 projects with a
total surface area of 1.2 mln ha (World Bank 2010, xiv). Initially, in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, the share of domestic investors was dominant, and at that time the
parcels given out were much smaller.8 Their number and size is now dwarfed
by allocations to foreigners (see Appendix 2).9
The speed with which the process has taken place took most observers, and also
most Ethiopian rural people, by surprise. It is not the fact that foreigners are so
interested in using Ethiopia’s fertile lands and cheap labour  this is not new, as
we also saw in Italian colonial times, notably in Eritrea (from 1890 to 1941 an Italian
colony) and in the ventures in the Awash Valley in the 1970s. It is more the readiness
with which the Ethiopian government allows them to take the land on such a large
scale, against low lease rates and with a lack of local consultation that generates
surprise and concern. The eagerness of Ethiopia’s government to have foreigners
take over land  which was for ages the core element of national or ethnic group
identification and the source of people’s livelihood, identity and pride  has created
confusion and local feelings of ‘sell-out’. The Ethiopian student movement cited
above would never have imagined the handing over of huge tracts of land to be
outsourced and farmed as enclaves by non-Ethiopians as a ‘solution’ to the country’s
agrarian problems.
The socio-economic effects of LSLAs have not been universally beneficial yet.
There has been production growth, lease income, and local investment, but the
process displaced scores of local smallholder farmers and herders and has closed
large spaces. The subject has seen little empirical research so far and is clearly in
need of a comprehensive appraisal that should take into account economic, social,
and also cultural factors. An analysis of not only the economic benefits would be
useful, but also a study of the political context and the policies behind would be
instructive to get a view on the pros and cons of the process of land acquisition and
of the agricultural investments and profits that (are supposed to) follow. This paper
mainly limits itself to an identification of the main issues at play.
The political and economic context
Ethiopian post-1991 policy was ostensibly based on developing the agrarian sector.
In 1996 the new Ethiopian government of the EPRDF10 launched the so-called
‘Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation’ (ADLI), whereby the gradual
commercialisation of smallholder agriculture was foreseen, which would in turn
create new production chains, trade channels, and diversification. Land remained
property of the state, however, thus dimming the dynamics of a property market and
of committed investments by the agrarian producers themselves. Inputs to farmers
were increased, for example, fertiliser, which they were almost forced to use. The
whole process was strongly top-down, state-dominated. Main investors were ruling
party-affiliated companies and individuals. The promotion of large-scale private
and state-owned farming was an explicit aim of the ADLI (Rahel 2003, 2) and
the 2003 Rural Development Policy and Strategies document (FDRE 2003), and the
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current LSLAs are to be seen as part of it. In 2005, a new ‘Plan for Accelerated
and Sustainable Development to End Poverty’ (PASDEP) was promulgated, drawn
up under donor-country and World Bank prodding. The hope expressed in the
PASDEP was that ‘. . . attracting commercial farms can, in turn, spur the
commercialization of smallholder agriculture.’11 In Ethiopia’s new 2010 Growth
and Transformation Plan (GTP), the development of biofuels is mentioned as a
priority (MoFED 2010, 3638).
Since 1991, marking the end of the civil war, agricultural productivity has
picked up under the ethno-federal government (cf. Dercon and Vargas Hill 2009,
67, 18, 56). Growth in the agrarian sector (the largest employer and foreign
exchange earning sector) was certainly realised and farmers have now more use rights
to land. Cultivators did gain more access to markets, could get fertilisers on credit
(although the process was often imposed, and debts crippled farmers when the
harvest was bad), and urban and export demand increased. Private firms emerged
that developed cash crop production (not only of coffee, but also of oilseeds, flowers,
and cereals). But an irreversible and rapid take-off in agriculture was not seen.
Property relations were not reformed and land redistribution was often used as a
questionable instrument to disqualify certain groups (cf. Crewett and Korf 2008).
Neither were durable problems of food insecurity solved  still every year at least
four to six million people suffer from lack of food and often face famine-like
conditions, and a total of 46% of Ethiopians is undernourished.12 For them, annual
foreign food aid is requested from abroad.13 The reason for the refusal of the
government to allow private or even communal-based landed property is probably to
keep the monopoly on power and not allow an agrarian class (i.e. a middle group
with leverage) to emerge. With foreign agro-companies there is no such danger.
As noted, the investment in agricultural lands in Ethiopia in the late 1990s
and 2000s started with domestic investors, both private and ruling party-affiliated
people, who bought land for commercial agriculture for export. This probably
gave the Ethiopian government the idea to open up the process for foreigners as well,
who had more capital and were politically not a danger. The 200708 global food
crisis and the resulting international run on African lands everywhere did the rest.
In Ethiopia we now find a strongly state-supported policy of land deals with
foreigners for economic and likely also political reasons. Allowing foreign parties
to take over use rights (via long-term leases) and exploitation of cultivable land,
rapidly implemented since early 2009, was confirmed as national policy at the annual
meeting of the ruling party EPRDF in September 2009. The promise of large-scale
land investment is no doubt attractive, and Ethiopia still has much agricultural
potential, and a categorical denial of its possibilities and future benefits would
be inappropriate. But indications are that the rush to dole out the land cuts local
people a raw deal, that no sufficiently good conditions are negotiated, that long-term
negative economic and environmental effects are not taken into consideration, and
that there is no certainty about the demonstration/diffusion effect of the foreign
commercial ventures for the local smallholder producers. There are, however, some
successful examples of this interaction between smallholders and large investors:
Two of the investors we interviewed used these creative interactions to promote their
business plans to regional development authorities. One farm sold certified seed to local
farmers; another imported an irrigation system new to the region and plans to introduce
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it to the broader community. They each rented farm equipment to smallholders and held
demonstration days to discuss farming techniques and new crop types with community
members. One had already introduced new crops to the adjacent village via an
‘‘outgrowing’’ scheme and was exporting smallholder products from the farm, thus
diversifying livelihoods for local farming households.14
But this ‘creative interaction’ does not hold for the majority of smallholders or for
pastoralists, who always lose their pasture lands and water access points and can only
become underpaid workers on the estates, an existence very few pastoralists would
like to consider. The encroachment on their rangeland follows a familiar path seen
many times over: closure, livelihood subversion, impoverishment, and decline. Often
they themselves are then blamed for ‘resource degradation’. The fear of this scenario
was frequently voiced by agro-pastoralists from southern Ethiopia that I interviewed
over the past few years.
The extent of cases of successful interaction with smallholders is not known, but
they exist, and with good government incentives they can be substantially increased.
The problems of land alienation, threats to subsistence agriculture, environmental
pressures, and lack of negotiated deals with the stake-holders remain, in the absence
of legal rules or their application and the bypassing of local customary tenure by the
authorities. Also, pastoralists and farmers in the outlying areas where most land is
qualified as ‘unused’ or ‘vacant’ by the government’ resent this view of their country
as empty, and resist the implied state appropriation of it.
a. Scale and extent of the deals
In Africa, Ethiopia is in the forefront of handing out land. In the past four
years (200710) it has signed over some 2.9 million acres (1.17 mln. ha.) of land,
mostly to foreign investors, and expects to lease a total of 7.4 million acres by 201315
(which will be almost 31,000 km2). Most of the first deals in 200607 were for biofuel
cultivation, where American, European, Indian and a few Israeli companies were in
the forefront. The chief agents in the land leasing at present are not the governments
of the, in name autonomous, regional states of Ethiopia, but the federal government.
In 2008 it issued (non-gazetted, that is, not legally confirmed) directives to the
regional governments to hand over their negotiation rights to the federal level for any
piece of land above a 1000 ha. The reason given was ‘corruption’, which indeed
occurred with the use of revenue from renting the land.16 Also, all foreign investors
must now first get an investment license from the federal authorities for any land
investment or acquisition before they can ask the regional states’ investment
authorities for a piece of land. Thus the federal government can enforce large
investments, reap in the land lease sums and put pressure on the regional
governments.
The idea behind it is of course ‘development’, economic growth as visible in GDP
figures, food market supply, growth in productive capacity, and hopefully technology
and management skill transfers. The federal government is the conversation partner
of the international donor counties and the global financial institutions such as
World Bank and IMF, whereby its prime purpose is to hand in the growth figures in
order to qualify for continued political support and (more) donor aid.17
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The income from these foreign ‘investor’ land leases is substantial and a welcome
addition to the federal treasury, perpetually short of foreign currency. The
government wants to reduce dependency of Western donor aid with its underlying
but loosely kept demands of more ‘good governance’ and respect for the rule-of-
law.18 However, the actual sums paid by foreign leasers per hectare or acre are
still surprisingly low. For instance, in Ethiopia the Indian company Karuturi Global
in 2009 was to pay c. $2.50 per acre19 or 135 Ethiopian birr per ha. (c. t6.50) which is
low also in comparison with the rate in other African countries.
Most of the LSLAs so far have been in the Oromiya, Amhara, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Afar and Southern Peoples’ regional states (Appendix 1). Interestingly, the
ruling party EPRDF has already been active with its own companies and members in
agricultural ventures over the last 15 years, and unconfirmed reports state it is giving
out new land to party members and political sympathisers, for example, some
90,000 ha. near Gambela town in 2009.20 The use of land as a gift to supporters and
to build political loyalty is a traditional practice of the Ethiopian state since early
imperial times (cf. Clapham 1988, 31, 16162).
b. Policy and political context
Land leases to foreigners, as noted above, are defended with reference to the
development potential of large new enterprises that invest in the country. The
Ethiopian government wants to make a quantum leap in developing commercial
agriculture, improve national food security, transform smallholder agriculture, and
realise export income not only from coffee and oilseeds but from a wider variety
of crops. In addition, another basic motive is the extra cash from the land leases for
the national government, in need of foreign currency. However, attaining food
security and developing commercial agriculture is unlikely to be realised without an
extra array of conditions to be imposed on the foreigners’ activities, such as
knowledge/technology transfer and employment and training of local people. On the
other hand, a beneficial effect of this investor activity is infrastructure outlay in the
land acquisition areas.
Local smallholder agriculture and pastoralism are seen by Ethiopia state policy
makers as underdeveloped and under-resourced, that is, as backward and lacking
scale, skills, and technology. That may be the case, but this is partly the result of
government neglect towards stimulating the small farmers by not giving security
of tenure and a conducive politico-legal framework. Most observers note that the
(undeniable) growth in agricultural production realised since 1991 could have been
much higher if certain dogmas about land ownership, control and use rights would
have been relaxed, and when recognition would have been given to the local people as
empowered to negotiate on their rights and access to land and take more production
and marketing decisions.
The favourite clause of state spokesmen, for example, at the Ethiopian National
Investment Promotion Agency, about the land currently given out is that it is unused
‘wasteland’, with no pre-existing inhabitants or users (cf. SPGM 2009, 29). This is
partly true but often incorrect. The statement is based on a ‘statist’, top-down view
of what the value and the user regimes of land are. Of course, there is vacant land in
Ethiopia, usually of poorer quality, but not all land so designated is or can be
intensively cultivated under the prevailing circumstances (including the relevance of
518 J. Abbink
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 00
:48
 18
 A
pri
l 2
01
2 
customary rights, unreliable rainfall patterns, lack of surface water). Most of it is
used for livestock pasture by local herding peoples, for gathering, for honey
production, wood, and other economic sidelines. Sometimes the ‘empty’ land is
just land that is left fallow for a year or so in a rotating field system.
Relevant for an understanding of the spectacular growth in (foreign) land
investments is that the Ethiopian federal government has put in place a model of
governance whereby all regional and local authorities (regions, zones, woredas) have
to deliver on investments: every year they have to show what investments they have
attracted and approved, and figures are of paramount importance here. Long-term
planning, a balance between local and national interests, respect of local user
practices, and environmental and ecological issues seem secondary. The sanction on
not performing and not showing investment growth is job demotion or dismissal.
In view of this pressure and of the impending threat of gimgema  appraisal/self-
criticism sessions21 used by the ruling party EPRDF to evaluate public office holders
 virtually any proposal is accepted and preconditions are often minimal. All regions
(and even many zones, a lower administrative unit) have websites where they
recommend the favourable investment climate and the stretches of available ‘land for
investment’. In 2009 the Southern Region’s website announced more than 180,000
hectares of land along the Omo River in southwest Ethiopia for lease.22 The region
is home to various agro-pastoral peoples (Bodi-Me’en, Mursi, Hamar, Karo,
Nyangatom, a.o.), who survived there for centuries and use the area intensively.
But in line with the ideology mentioned above, a Ministry of Agriculture official in
2009 stated again that the land in South Omo was ‘empty’ and that the government
had taken environmental and social considerations into account when allocating
land for investors. ‘The people and the local governments are very happy,’ he said.
‘We have not seen any conflict between investors and the community.’23 It is not clear
on what these statements were based.
c. Economic and environmental aspects
The economic impact of the enterprises set up on the newly acquired land is yet
difficult to assess. They have just started and cannot yet be fully evaluated as to their
various benefits and drawbacks. But benefits are primarily on the national level  the
central government cashing the land lease fees  and to a lesser extent on that of
regional governments or local communities.
Furthermore, as most of the foreign entrepreneurs, backed by their diplomatic
representatives, in the name of ‘development’, retain their own expatriate manage-
ment and will export all of their produce to their countries of origin, their role in
developing the productive capacity of Ethiopian agriculture  which is held up by the
Ethiopian federal government as one central argument in favour  will be very
limited. As noted, the LSLA-based firms are geared to the production of biofuel
crops (jatropha, castor beans, sugar cane), cash crops (flowers, oil palms, and
cotton), and also food crops such as rice, soy beans, maize, and wheat. Figures
released so far indeed show that virtually the entire production has gone abroad, and
little if any was brought on the local Ethiopian market. If the net result of this
‘exogenous modernisation’ of Ethiopian agriculture is the reduction of the local
producers’ capacity for food production and self-sufficiency due to displacement of
smallholders, the take-over of their land, and dependence on global market forces,
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D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 00
:48
 18
 A
pri
l 2
01
2 
then the entire venture will run into failure. If the current disconnect between large
foreign firms and local producers and markets is not mended, there will be
little improvement in sustainable agriculture, livelihoods, and food security aims in
the long term. Some of the lands allocated to foreign investors in the Benishangul-
Gumuz and Afar regional states were previously being used for shifting cultivation
and dry-season grazing and are no longer available for local residents,24 implying
threats to existing livelihoods.
Secondly, ecological factors are also part of the long-term economic equation,
and the effects of the large agro-businesses on local environmental conditions need to
be taken into account. The fertility of soils is often dependent on field rotation and
certain specific management techniques as developed by local people, and the local
balance should be studied before introducing a unitary cultivation regime with
fertiliser, etc. It is also known that these large firms need inordinate amounts of
surface water for the cultivation of their crops. This will  as is already the case
with the dozens of flower farms in the central Ethiopia  lead to water shortages for
farmers in the vicinity, and undermine subsistence agriculture and horticulture
(cf. Mulugeta 2009). There is some awareness of this problem but little remedial
action. In one instance, the company Saudi Star Agricultural Development
(owned by Saudi-Ethiopian business tycoon M. al-Amoudi) which started a
10,000-hectare rice farm in the Gambela region obtained a 60-year lease for a low
rent and an authorisation to pump water from the Alwero River, although in
return for selling a portion of its rice production on the local market.25 But
depending on the amount of water used the consequences for local cultivators could
still be serious.
New agricultural investors (M. al-Almoudi and the Indian firm Karuturi) are
currently endangering Gambela National Park, an in name protected area, by
annexing valuable tracts of forest. Species of vital importance to the local Anywa
population are being destroyed. Among these were shea trees,26 which provide
many locally needed substances (cooking oil, lotion, and foodstuff). In addition,
there are unconfirmed reports that old Anywa burial grounds are being bulldozered.
Similar developments are seen in the ‘sacred’ forests in the Gomera region in south
west Ethiopia (close to Gambela) which are used intensively by the Majangir people:
since early 2011 a large part is being developed by another Al-Amoudi enterprise.27
So far, few if any agricultural investment projects have had an environmental
impact assessment (required by law). The problem of potential ecological damage,
however, became glaring after several studies of the environmental impact of the
new flower farms, operating since 1997 in central Ethiopia. Apart from the growing
water scarcity in the immediate environment, the pesticides and fertiliser residue led
to pollution and high nitrate concentrations (Mulugeta 2009; Tamiru 2008).
As the recent World Bank report The Rising Global Interest in Farm Land
indicates (World Bank 2010, 88), in Ethiopia the EIA requirements for the new
agricultural investment schemes were usually waived as ‘sunset clauses’ for project
approval. This is a potentially disastrous course that will contribute to blight the
natural environment due to ill-considered long-term consequences. These may
include the loss of biodiversity. While this kind of loss may be inevitable in certain
locations anyway, pre-project studies of the environmental conditions and their
eventual management by local people should be made before massive land
development schemes come in and worsen the situation. As the UN and World
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Bank-sponsored 2005 report The Wealth of the Poor already said, the consideration
and integration of ecological factors in policy is a key to effective aid and
development.28 This point is, however, absorbed neither by national governments
nor by the UN and WB in their actual policies.
Thirdly, the economic benefits for workers employed on the new large farms
are mixed, even if they are ‘lucky’ to get a job there. There is a gender difference: for
poor, landless, or unmarried or widowed women, wage earning can be something
positive even if it is very low, and the women do not know their rights and are
unorganised. One woman cited29 said that her life was changed by the wage she now
earned (0/80 U$ cents a day): ‘I don’t have my own land, so I have no way of feeding
my family’, said Ababu Nagari. ‘Now I have work and a little money. I am happy
these investors come.’ (Heinlein, 2010). For others, likely the male married farmer
majority, it is rather different. In a response widely echoed by rural dwellers in
Ethiopia, one farmer said: ‘We are for development of our country, but we cannot
develop our country when land is in the hands of the government,’ he said. ‘You can
work on your land, and all of a sudden, they push you out of your land’ (ibid).30
According to the recent World Bank study (2010), the job creation rate of the new
schemes so far is extremely limited: for the cases where information was given it
was only 0,0005 job per ha. (World Bank 2010, 45). So most likely the schemes will
likely not create many jobs, certainly not in replacement of jobs lost by locals because
of land alienation or dispossession.
What is left for dispossessed farmers is indeed to move out, with the reportedly
low sums of compensation money they get for their land (which of course was legally
under state law not even theirs), and go to nearby towns to look for work.
The money is finished in a month or two and poverty sets in. In the past three
years the town of Na¨qa¨mte in western Ethiopia (Oromiya region) has been swelled
by thousands of such displaced farmers. When local farmers stage protests against
the establishment of foreign agro-companies they run the risk of being arrested, as
happened with 80 farmers in Bako Tibe in western Ethiopia.31 Other cases are known
where farmers were removed from their land and did not receive any compensation.32
Many others will be resettled by the government (Gambella PNRS 2002 EC; Davison
2010).
The labour conditions and practices of the foreign agrarian enterprises are not
well-known but are the issue of anecdotal debate. Characteristics often mentioned
are:
 Low wages for local employed workers, often from dispossessed families 
who have no choice in order to survive.
 Massive import of foreign management and workers, forming enclaves.
 Little interaction with local people.
 Negligible training of locals, little or no skills transfers, little or no preparation
of indigenous-Ethiopian capacity, and if they happen they are an unintended
side-effect: it is not a condition placed upon them by the government. There
are interactions of some large-scale foreign farms with the local smallholders
(see above, ‘The political and economic context’) whereby a demonstration
effect of ‘good practices’ can be seen, but the government’s role must perhaps
be to stipulate conditions for this when a contract with an LSLA party is
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 521
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 00
:48
 18
 A
pri
l 2
01
2 
made, so as to oblige the foreign investors to do this in a standard, not
haphazard and voluntary, way (as is mostly the case now).
In addition, some reports mention the often excessive use of environmental
resources, notably water, to the detriment of locals and their needs, as well as the
absence of awareness or recognition by the new investors of the cultural ties of local
people to their (former) land.
Finally, the economic activities frequently contribute to emerging local conflicts.
For example, the new plantations in the South Omo Zone have pushed local
inhabitants  members of the Hamar, Karo, Aari and Mursi ethnic groups  into the
Omo National Park for pasture and forage, where in 2010 several game scouts
trying to oust them were killed. The case of the destruction of the biosphere and
livelihood basis of the hard-pressed Anywa people in the Gambela region was
already mentioned. Other inter-group clashes were also reported, including those
between local ethnic groups, who contest a smaller number of resources due to
shrinking territories and blocked transhumance routes. In 2009 there were reports of
a conflict in the Shiniile area in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region, when c. 60,000
ha. were given out to a Chinese business group and some domestic investors.
Protests by local inhabitants were suppressed by government militia forces. In
general, managers and workers of the new investor companies (notably when they are
Ethiopian, such as the Al-Amoudi companies) are also discouraged from talking to
outsider and reporters.
Legal aspects
The legal aspect is seriously under-researched, but an understanding of the
interaction of local, customary law rules with state and international law is needed.
In much of Africa and Ethiopia, land is the traditional patrimony of the
resident inhabitants, of people and ethnic groups who have lived there for generations
and built up settlement and use rights. The customary tie to the land is not a legal
fiction but validated not only through practice and residence, but also via
locally adapted cultivation systems, indigenous knowledge, and ritual. Customary
law governed the local relations and patterns of land use. In colonial and post-
independence times, state law tended in principle to overrule these local law
traditions. In Ethiopia, customary tenure and forms of semi-private and
communal tenure existed until the 1974 revolution, and customary law was
constitutionally recognised for all domains where national statutory law was not
yet issued. But in revolutionary Ethiopia in 1975 all land was declared state property
and has remained so ever since, also under the post-1991 ethno-federal regime. This
makes it easy to dispose of land in any way the government wants. For instance, the
Ethiopian constitution adopted in 1995, in Article 40.5, legally recognises pastoral
lands in terms of a common property regime, implying some protection or at least
ground for negotiation of the local users with state authorities about these
designated pastoral rangelands. In practice, there is little or no recognition of
customary tenure underlying this right. The same holds for customary land tenure in
cultivation. The Ethiopian highland farmers, for example, knew a deep-rooted and
intricate system of inherited possession or conditional ownership rights, rooted in
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kinship and neighbourhood relations (the rist system). It was abolished in 1975, but
not forgotten. In a hesitant start some years ago, the state initiated registering user
rights in the densely populated central highland agrarian areas. In the outlying, less
populated areas where pastoralists and shifting cultivators live, land is easier
appropriated and handed out to others. The rights or even the access to land of these
categories of people have even less legal status under national law, and can therefore
hardly be contested by them in a court of law.
While in various regions there are indeed under- or unused parcels of land that
might be given a more productive purpose, no adequate preliminary research is
done on local conditions; nor are decisions to do so discussed with the people who
live there  despite that various activities of the agro-companies starting business
there can significantly impact on the wider environment used by them. Most
important are: the extraction of water for cultivation purposes, decline of wild life
and plant species used by locals, closure of grazing areas, and possibly, pollution. An
example of such a scenario can be predicted for the project within the confines of
Gambela National Park, in a territory used by the Anywa people. This project has
the additional problem of seriously affecting an already designated protected nature
reserve.33
These foreign agro-companies thus tend to form enclave enterprises taking off on
lands inhabited by a variety of local peoples that have no legal title to their
land and cannot protect it. Their customary claims are simply not recognised. The
issue of respecting legal and customary rights is bypassed or belittled by national
governments, and also by donor countries and their investors, in the name of
economic development. The only remaining role for displaced local farmers is to be
wage labourers on the foreign agro-farms, or move away to towns or other areas. But
a recent UN report has called attention to the human rights challenges posed by
LSLAs (De Schutter 2009)  challenges far from being resolved. The conflict-
generating aspects of LSLAs are significant. An early example in Ethiopia was the
conflict around the Birale Cotton Company, a plantation set up in 199596 by a
local investor on land used by the Ts’amai ethnic group. In 1999, army units
were called in to forcefully remove protesting Tsamai who resented the expropriation
of their pasture land. More of such conflicts in the new wave of land investments can
be predicted. The Anywa people in Gambela, apart from their running political
conflict with the Nuer people who encroached on their lands since 1991, are faced
with a serious threat of expropriation and land requisitioning via the foreign
LSLAs.34 The government does not hesitate to use force before sitting down to
discuss or work out a compromise.
Local people in southwest Ethiopia have trouble in understanding why they
should yield their living space to foreigners, especially when they were not asked, and
state that they cannot accept that pasture and buffer zones for grazing their
cattle in times of trouble (drought or conflict) are being alienated from them
(cf. Oakland Institute 2011, 3941). They also fear that dependency on outside forces,
the state as well as the new companies, will increase, and that their subsistence base
will be endangered. Few civic organisations or NGOs, however, has taken up their
point, and a legal case cannot be made by them due to lack of knowledge and expertise.
This brings us to the social and cultural aspects.
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Social and cultural aspects
Social and cultural aspects impinge on the economics of foreign land exploitation.
It is a recurrent mistake in state development discourse and much of international
development studies to see ‘development’ only or predominantly as a quantitative,
material process. Economics are conditional not only on the above legal and policy
aspects but on the social fabric, the ‘social capital’ and the cultural dispositions of
people involved, who in the Asian and African ‘developing countries’ are often
ethnically and social different from the dominant core of the state. In the Ethiopian
case  like in Madagascar, where the appropriation of land where culturally
significant tombs of kin groups were located led to disturbances as well as to a
change of national government in 2008, and to general fears of cultural loss  these
‘non-economic’ aspects cannot be neglected. But they are not part of the public
discourse about ‘investment’ and ‘development’. Apart from the often morally
questionable nature of state authorities disposing of land without ascertaining its
comprehensive value and socio-cultural role for existing communities and without
consulting the ‘stakeholders’ or a negotiated compensation, it is detrimental to
stability and security to enforce an extraneous land regime in conditions where local
people feel the land is their patrimony or heritage. The concept of ‘heritage’ is not
self-evident, however, and is subject to ‘negotiation’, for example, in socio-economic
and legal battles. In Ethiopia, the local population is often powerless, by law and by
practice, to contest state measures and bring the case as to what they often see as
heritage to the courts. Courts they see as a state institution supporting the powers
that be, and experience has proven them largely right.35 In addition, since the 1975
promulgation of land as state property, peasants have lost any legal claim on the land
they cultivate as ‘heritage’, because the traditional kin- or residence-based rights to it
were no longer seen valid in any respect. Land being a state commodity thus
devalued the ‘sentimental’ bond (as state policy makers often term it) that people
might feel with it, even though their ancestors had possessed or cultivated it for ages.
As De Schutter (2009, 274) noted, the commodification of land has gone to the
extreme, and the cultural significance of land is forgotten.
Similar arguments against the sudden and massive take-over of land are now being
heard among the pastoralists and shifting cultivators in the outlying areas where land
acquisitions take place. People interviewed from the Ethiopian Southwest (e.g. from
the Suri and Me’en, the ethnic groups of the area) had trouble in seeing where the
central or regional governments took the right to dispossess them of land they saw as
their own and used seasonally (for gathering, bee-keeping, dry season pasture, etc.).
One of them stated: ‘We have lived here for ages, before we had even heard of
[emperor] Menilik or of the Ethiopian government, and we survived in it. Why is this
not seen as our land, as the source of our living? Can the cattle go anywhere else?
I have not heard the government ask us something. We should have a say in what is
done with it and we should not be undermined in our way of life here.’36 This was in
response to the news, in mid-2010, that a large rubber plantation was planned in a
part of the Bench-Maji Zone in southwest Ethiopia, on land used by local people like
Dizi, Suri and Me’en for pasture, gathering, activities and some cultivation. The
Indian-Malaysian company Harrisons Malayalam Ltd37 was expected to acquire a
huge tract of savannah land for the purpose. It was reported by local informants
that they wanted to attract (import) 40,000 foreign workers.38 The economic,
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environmental and social impact of this transplantation of foreigners would be huge
in this area of pastoralists and subsistence farmers. It would change migration and
transhumance routes, impact on local resource access and culture. The responses of
local people on this plan were not favourable, and many feared to become
outnumbered, overwhelmed. It was seen as an intimidating new venture which would
make them into second-class citizens. First of all, the local conceptions of ‘ownership’
and use were based on notions of historical precedence (who settled there first),
indigenous environmental and local knowledge, customary patterns of ‘open’ resource
use, and mutual interaction (via product exchange and sale on local markets,
where various groups had niches), which locals expect to be discussed and negotiated
about. Secondly, it was interesting to note that the area under discussion here was
only extensively used by the local ethnic groups, and was culturally not that important
(for example, there were no burial places or ritual sites), but in the face of the
impending ‘invasion’ the land was being redefined as ‘historically ours’, and as not
freely available for outsiders. Thus, a process of contestation on what heritage value
land can have, or is declared to have, has begun, whereby the local people will likely be
the losers.
Contestation about the LSLAs and large farms is a general phenomenon in
Africa, and is often based on good reasons. However, critical discourse is usually
discouraged, also by the Ethiopian state authorities. Indeed, compared to other
African countries (Ghana, Madagascar, Senegal), the Ethiopian government takes a
strong stance against any independent voices about the policies it adopted, and
rural protests are repressed with force, if need be. The voice of the local people who
dwell on the land or extensively use it is seldom heard and not deemed relevant.
Hardly any debate is entertained about how to deal with and adapt to social and
cultural values attached to land and its use. Neither are independent trade unions,
farmers’ unions, etc. allowed in the country. A few NGOs have some influence,
especially if allied to international groups, but the limited national debate that is heard
(in the press39) about the pros and cons of the land deal policy does not impact on the
political process. But one of the few cases where action by NGOs and local
stakeholders was successful was that of the Gewata wetlands, near Gojeb in the
west of Oromiya regional state, an area recognised by UNESCO as a biosphere
reserve. According to a local informant (September 2010), it was saved from a Saudi
investor wanting to turn it into an area for producing food crops for export. After
long debate and negotiations with local and federal authorities, with critical input
from scientists emphasising the rich biodiversity and important role of these wetlands
in the water supply of the wider region, the project was called off. But it will now
probably be developed for tourism.
Prospect and conclusion
While in Ethiopia there are historical precedents of schemes giving out local land
without consultation of the local inhabitants or users (e.g. the big commercial and
state farms in the Awash area in imperial times, or large-scale resettlement schemes
and ‘collective’ state farms in the Derg period), today the scale is much larger and
geared especially to foreign players. Controversy is rampant and generates a new
counter-discourse that will make the schemes unpopular and foci of conflict.40 There
is a growing perception in Ethiopia that national territory  ‘the motherland’  and
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culturally and socially significant locations are being given away, threatening people’s
‘social capital’ and the ethno-cultural identities of local groups, often tied to land or
territory. From a purely economic point of view, Ethiopia’s dependency on foreign
sources will also increase. Nationalist issues thus mingle with social, economic, and
cultural issues (e.g. on ‘heritage’ and local group identity) in emerging protests
against this, what many people call, sell-out.
Research on land deals in Ethiopia so far has been scant, but what is known
forces us to agree with the World Bank, which in its 2010 report noted that many
recent deals have been bad news for poor people, and that weak land governance, a
failure to protect local communities’ land rights, lack of country capacity, and
unclear investor strategies (cf. Evans 2010) are frequent problems. There may also be
a lack of overall national development strategies that balance investment, develop-
ment, and well-being.
The LSLAs in Ethiopia are felt as an additional threat by local people living in or
near the land to be taken over. In the past decades, they have already had to face
collectivisation of land and dispossession, forced villagisation, resettlement schemes
bringing in thousands of northerners from drought-prone areas, and in some areas
massive dam construction (still ongoing). In these ventures, the Ethiopian govern-
ment’s policy approach shows continuity and recalls the classic large-scale state
engineering schemes that Scott has analysed in his book Seeing like a State (1998).
Also the LSLAs signify ‘development’ from above, without debate or negotiations
with citizens, with forced displacement if need be, and state action driven by power
hegemony and a monolithic model of ‘economic growth’. Neither the nature and
speed of the process nor the manner of its implementation are problematised, as the
goal is sacred.
In this drive to develop, to attain GDP growth and what they call ‘transforma-
tion’, the Ethiopian government has the uncritical support of Western donor
countries, which show to have but rhetorical care for issues of well-being or human
rights, and in fact condone the abuse that may occur.41 Obviously, overall
development is a desirable goal for poor countries such as Ethiopia, with low
GDP, poor facilities, a lack of legal security, massive poverty, no welfare system,
over-population, food insecurity of 4 to 10 million people every year, repression,
and a shaky human rights record (according to human rights organisations as well
as the US State Department reports.42) But it is difficult to see why this process has
to flout governance criteria and social justice precepts that were set out in the
1995 constitution and a host of other laws, why risks are taken with the environment,
livelihoods and with security issues, why national debates and locally tailored
alternatives in land policy are not considered, and why the customary use rights
and relevant knowledge of local people are ignored (Vermeulen and Cotula
2010).43
The current land acquisitions in Africa can indeed be termed a new ‘scramble’,
because influential and wealthy foreign powers hasten to acquire land in order to
secure their interests (future fuel needs and food market demand abroad). While direct
political sovereignty is of course not exercised, the enclave economy of these foreign
firms, in connivance with a national government that gives little evidence of putting
citizens’ interests first, has aspects of ‘neo-colonialism’ (cf. A. Rice 2009). Tax
holidays, easy production conditions, lack of environmental rule enforcement, low
wages, low or often total lack of compensation for displaced people and cheap land-
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lease rates for the foreigners contribute to this perception (Rice 2010). Most deals
also seem hasty and feverish, done in competition with others. They are approved
by African governments that do not negotiate properly and ignore local stake-
holders, whom they usually control with a combination of political-legal force and if
need be repression. In Ethiopia, this eagerness to dole out land against low rates and a
lack of conditions set is particularly puzzling, as the country has a relatively strong
state compared to others on the continent, structures for rule enforcement and a
political ideology said to be geared to the rural producers.44 The government could
have done much more to optimise the advantages that such deals might have. All
countries subjected to, or participant in, the land scramble will have to face the
possible adverse effects of large-scale land exploitation on ecology and environment
(see the flower business) and on socio-political stability (see the protests and
dissatisfaction of displaced locals and the emergence of poor, landless groups drifting
towards the cities).
In view of the economic, environmental, and socio-cultural problems looming,
the LSLAs in Ethiopia and elsewhere need regulation and a harmonisation of
interests of more than two stakeholders (government and foreign companies).
International institutions such as the World Bank, World Food Programme, or
FAO, let alone human rights and cultural organisations, have frequently mentioned
this need. FAO spokesmen, including director Jacques Diouf, have criticised
the current land rush practices and have proposed the development of a code of
conduct.
The few cases from Ethiopia known so far suggest that improvements could be
made along the following lines:
 Develop a legal framework where all ‘stakeholders’ can be involved.
 Sell/lease the land in auctions, and do not hurry giving away the land.
 Negotiate a package with investors, notably foreigners; reduce the waiving of
taxes, free exports, etc.
 Develop proper compensation rules/packages for people losing their
(access to) land, in accordance with Art. 44.2 of the Constitution and
Regulation 135/2007 on compensation (Council of Ministers 2007) and
implement them.
 Commission comprehensive economic, environmental, and socio-cultural
research preliminary to land deals to asses the wider context, likely impacts
and long-term consequences.
 Respect local customary rights and work out compromises, not impose and
enforce, recognise that some land can simply not be taken, such as core ritual-
religious places or burial sites.
 Respect pastoral grazing rights or negotiate sharing deals (cf. Eyasu and
Feyera 2010, 19).
 Reform the national land law: allow communal property and conditional
private property, so as to create a more dynamic land market.
 Demand training and transfer of agricultural knowledge from the large
investor companies to the local agrarian producers; stimulate interaction.
 Smallholders in Ethiopia should not be discounted and seen as secondary
to large foreign investors in agriculture. Annually, these farmers are said to be
opening up on average some 1 mln ha. of new land for cultivation, and more
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than 85% of annual agricultural production still comes from the smallholders.
One possibility is contract farming, but even that carries risks to sustainability
and long-term success (see Friends of the Earth 2010, 212).
 Oblige the foreign producers to bring part of the produce on the local market
against locally affordable prices.
 In view of the rising value of land in Ethiopia, the government should assure
continuity of successful agrarian schemes and not terminate or transfer them
to other companies for higher lease rates without guarantees for productive
capacity and for workers. One can predict that in 5 or 10 years’ time the lease
rates will be up significantly.
The objection that the government will give to the pleas for regulation and
inclusivity, for example, that there is no time and that otherwise the interested foreign
parties will go elsewhere, is not convincing: the land will not run away. As American
author Mark Twain once said: ‘Get a piece of land; they don’t make it any more’.
That is, there will always be a ‘market’, and prices will rise. Neither convincing is the
remark that it would ‘slow down development’ (assuming we know what this concept
exactly means). No serious national government should engage in land deals to
foreigners without proper pre-project research and adequate preparation. There is
little public evidence that Ethiopia has done either.
While offering a highly prevaricating and insufficient analysis, the recent World
Bank report (2010) on the land acquisitions  not without reason speaking of a ‘land
rush’  has highlighted many of the problems mentioned so far. It did not include a
thorough discussion of the legal and socio-cultural context and effects of the
phenomenon (cf. GRAIN 2010a). Time is ripe for detailed field-based studies to
assess the entire range of problems, the clash of legal and ‘rights’ narratives, the
environmental aspects, and make an inventory of actual local responses, including
the conflict potential. Such studies would help to work towards informing and
including local people  as users and owners of the lands since generations  in the
process of imposed change redefining their livelihoods and their identity (cf. Cotula
et al. 2009, 3, 90).
In conclusion, most of the current land acquisitions, with some justification
called ‘land grabs’ (in the eyes of the local population, not in the statutory legal
sense) carry economic and social risks and do often not deliver (as even the World
Bank report asserts 2010, 51, and cf. Blas 2010).
The phenomenon of LSLAs can also have the effect of subverting the rule of law,
democratic governance, and constitutional/human rights in the broad sense of the
term (see Kugelman and Levenstein 2009, 478). Rights to livelihood and to
protection from resource alienation and citizens’ rights to be heard are insufficiently
respected. In Ethiopia the old revolutionary ideal of ‘land to the tiller’ has been
abandoned, as the tiller is urged to work on the ‘land of the foreigner’. In fact, the
LSLA process in Ethiopia is an example of the curious global alliance of
international capitalist enterprise (including China, reinventing state capitalism)
and undemocratic governance in the countries with the land resources. This process
will yield great profits but also do serious damage, and no voluntary ‘codes of
conduct’ will impact on it. This is not likely to be a ‘win-win’ situation, unless
consultative structures are improved, limiting conditions are imposed, social and
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environmental impact assessments are made and are taken seriously, and the
durability of the large-scale projects is properly assessed.
The citation at the head of this paper, ascribed to Ethiopian emperor Tewodros
II (r. 185568), who spoke these words when the British invaded his country in an
1868 punitive expedition, would perhaps be seen as pathetic by the current Ethiopian
authorities. Nevertheless, for local smallholders and pastoralists, let alone for
politically oriented nationalists, it resonates strongly. They feel anxiety in the face
of an unprecedented sell-out that not only has an economic-environmental impact
but also a socio-cultural and psychological one; the local producers perceive that
they are unwanted on the land which they thought was their own and denied a say in
their destiny. They seem to be on the receiving end again. The challenge, also for
African governments, is to develop shared regimes that allow local producers and
investors to join forces, and to secure both the production of local (subsistence) food
crops as well as the production of new (cash) crops for domestic and foreign markets
that give local farmers and labourers a stake in the new investments.
Notes
1. Cited in: D. Levine, ‘Protecting Ethiopia?’, online paper at: http://www.eineps.org/forum/
viewtopic.php?t2806 (accessed 4 June 2010).
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5. Interview, Addis Ababa, 3 August 2009. Information on the Ethiopian case is based on
interviews done in the country in JulyAugust 2009 and September 2010.
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7. See: Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ethiopia (2007), Biofuel Development and Utilisation
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cultivation was given as 23, 3 mln ha., roughly one-fifth of the country’s total agricultural
surface.
8. In late 2010 there were 49 domestic investors in this sector with projects above a 1000 ha.
9. One of the biggest domestic investors was BDFC Ethiopia Industry P.L.C., which in 2008
obtained a claim to 18,000 ha. of land to grow sugarcane (for ethanol and sugar) in the
Awi Zone, Amhara Region (Oakland Institute 2011, 2). Another was the Ambasel
Jatropha Project, a private (ruling party-linked) company that obtained 20,000 ha. of land,
with an option to expand to 80,000 ha., for a jatropha plantation in a forest in Metekel
Zone, Amhara Region. Production was said to be mainly for the domestic market.
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20. See: http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2010/03/07/justifiable_concerns_over_ethiopia_s_rec?
blog15.
21. Basically it is a non-constitutional and non-electoral internal party control mechanism.
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26. The Vitellaria paradoxa, also known as Butyrospermum parkii.
27. See: ‘Ethiopian ‘‘sacred forests’’ sold to Indian tea producer’ (Online: http://farmlandgrab.
org/post/view/18190).
28. See ‘Ecology is key to effective aid, UN told’, in: Nature 437 (8 September 2005), p. 180.
29. See P. Heinlein, ‘Foreign agro firms scoop up Ethiopian farmland’, VOA news, 22
February 2010 (Online: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/Foreign-Agro-
Firms-Scoop-Up-Ethiopian-Farmland84973402.html, accessed 4 September 2010).
30. See also the film ‘Food crisis and the global land grab’, a Planet for Sale2 documentary,
at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?vIU1-PpxqeZc.
31. See: ‘Ethiopia: HRLHA presents concern over land grabs at the UN 13th session
Human Rights Council’ (Online: http://www.oromoindex.com/latest-news/ethiopia-hrlha-
presents-concern-over-land-grabs-at-the-un-13th-session-human-gadaacom-oduu-news.html,
accessed 30 August 2010).
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32. Cf. the farmer cited in: ‘Land grabbing still rampant in Ethiopia’, in: The Reporter
(Addis Ababa), 4 September 2010, p. 9.
33. See: ‘Al-Amoudi to farm inside Gambella National Park’ (message of 10 December
2009), online: http://www.geocities.com/dagmawi/Zebenya/Zebenya.html, accessed 23
December 2009.
34. For a quite radical view, see: GRAIN, ‘Land grabs threaten Anyuak  GRAIN interviews
Nyikaw Ochalla’, in Seedling, April 2010b, pp. 1213 (http://www.grain.org/seedling/?
id680).
35. In interviews with farmers in the Southern Region, Wolaitta, Oromiya and Wollo
(20042009) this point was constantly reiterated.
36. Interview with informants in Addis Ababa, 3 August 2009, 9 September 2010.
37. Cf. ‘Harrisons Malayalam plans to develop plantations in Ethiopia’, online: http://www.
thehindubusinessline.com/2010/09/15/stories/2010091552060300.htm (accessed 1 October
2010).
38. I could not get confirmation of this. The extent of unconfirmed rumours circulating
indicates the apprehensions and the lack of transparency in the LSLA business.
39. Cf. ‘Land grabbing still rampant in Ethiopia’, in: The Reporter (Addis Ababa), 4
September 2010.
40. One example: ‘Sululta town residents revolt against land giveaway’, ESAT news (in
Amharic), 12 November 2010. http://www.youtube.com/results?search_querySululta
townresidents&aqf. See also Ray and Roy 2010.
41. A confirmation of this came in the recent critical but well-researched report of Human
Rights Watch (2010), although quickly denied by the Ethiopian government and the
DAG, the donor countries’ group in Ethiopia (See their website: http://www.dagethiopia.
org).
42. See: US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
2009 Human Rights Report: Ethiopia (Online: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/
af/135953.htm).
43. A study of the legacy of the land expropriations for large state and private farms in the
Afar area since the 1970s would yield lessons: these ventures undermined Afar livelihoods
and probably contributed to making the Afar area what it is now: one of the most famine-
prone in Ethiopia.
44. However, as the current phase of the global land rush will end in a couple of years when
the lands will have been divided among the foreign players, it is likely that the central
government will substantially raise the fees, whereupon the foreign investors will face the
choice to pay or to leave and lose on their investments already made. This tendency
already started in 2011; see Oakland Institute 2011, 29.
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Appendix 1. Map of Ethiopia.
Appendix 2. Some major foreign land deals and projects in Ethiopia, 200710.
Flora Ecopower (Germany), 2007
14,000 ha. for jatropha and castor bean cultivation, envisaged for expansion to 200,000 ha.
This 77 mln $ project took part of the Babile Elephant Sanctuary reserve in eastern Oromiya,
Source: UNDP (online: www.africa.upenn.edu/eue_web/newzones.gif&imgrefurl=)
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with government permission. (Source: Thompson 2008, 519; Reuters FACTBOX: Investing in
Africa: Land and agriculture, 7 October 2008; Friends of the Earth 2010, 23). On 28 April
2010 this enterprise folded, due to bad management and lack of profitability (See: www.afrik-
news.com/article17480.html), but restarted in 2011.
These are the largest schemes. The preferred trend in Ethiopia today is to give out land in huge
tracts, a policy which allows the federal government to take more control. Until late 2009 the
average size of plots given out was c. 700 ha., and roughly half of the investors were ‘domestic’
(which in the statistics included ‘other African’ investors). Smaller deals were concluded by
individuals like Nigerian ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo, who in 2009 acquired 200 ha. for a
business venture, and current Djiboutian president Ismail O. Guelleh, who leased 130 ha.
An overview of land allocations for biofuel companies (49 projects) in various regions of the
country (until late 2008) was given in the report by the local Ethiopian NGO Melca Mahiber
(2008), Rapid Assessment of Biofuels Development Status in Ethiopia and Proceedings of the
National Workshop on Environmental Impact Assessment and Biofuels (Addis Ababa:
MELCA), pp. 4650.
(see: ‘Flora EcoPower resumes biofuel farm activities’, Capital (Addis Ababa), 15 November
2010).
Becco Biofuels and National Biodiesel Corporation (USA), 2007
Agreed to lease 35,000 ha. in Amaro (SNNPRS), for cultivation of diverse biofuels.
(Source: ‘The new scramble for Africa’, online at: www.grain.org/seedling/?id481, accessed 2
July 2010).
Karuturi (India), 2008
Run an 11,000 ha. farm in Bako (Oromiya), since 2008. Conditions: no rent for six years, and
135 birr (7 euro) per hectare per year for the remainder of the 50-year lease. Also run a 100,000
ha. (120 km.-wide) farm in the Gambela Region, with option or claim to extend to 300,000.
Conditions: rent of 15 birr per hectare (74 eurocents); freedom to export as much of its
produce as it likes; workers’ salary: 10 birr (95 eurocents) a day (one birr above the
minimum) and meals to the workers.
(Source: Xan Rice 2010; see contract document on: http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18548)
Saudi Star Agricultural Development (Saudi ArabiaEthiopia), 2008
10,000 ha. for rice farming in Gambela, since 2008. The Saudi-Ethiopian billionaire
businessman Mohammed al-Almoudi is involved in this (and many other) companies.
(Source: Xan Rice 2010.)
Horizon Ethiopia (another M. al-Amoudi company), 2010
100,000 ha. of land in the Gambela region, for oil palm cultivation. Projected expansion to
250,000 ha.
(Source: Indian Ocean Newsletter, 11 October 2010; Addis Fortune, 25 January 2009).
National Bank of Egypt, 2009
20,000 ha. of land in Afar Region for agricultural food products, to be developed in 201011.
(Source: Agence de Presse Africaine, 30 December 2009).
Sonnati Agro-Farms (India), 2009
10,000 ha. for rice, pulses and cereal production, in Gambella Region.
Source: The Oakland Institute, 2011, p. 2.
Almidha (India), 2010
28,000 ha. for sugar cane production in Oromiya Region.
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Source: The Oakland Institute, 2011, p. 2.
Ruchi Agri Plc. (India), 2010
25,000 ha. for soybean cultivation in Benishangul-Gumuz state, and 25,000 ha. in Gambela
state, under a lease for 25 years. Includes the setting up of a processing unit, with an option to
double the surface to be leased.
(Sources: www.dailyethiopia.com/index.php?aid555, and http://allafrica.com/stories/
201007200770.html, 19 July 2010).
An association of farmers from the Punjab, 2010
50,000 hectares of land in 25- to 40-year leases for export food crops. Conditions: tax
exemption of imports and equipment, and tax exemption on exports, no rent for the first five
years, then a rent of $9 per ha. per year.
(Source: Indian Ocean Newsletter, 11 October 2010).
Global Energy Ethiopia (Israel; part of the Group Machiels, Belgium), 2007
A 7500 ha. outsourcing project in Wolaitta via community farming for castor bean/ jatropha
production (option on 30,000 ha.), active since 2007. Includes the construction of a biodiesel
factory in Soddo, Wolaitta.
(Source: www.biofuelsdigest.com/blog2/2008/03/28/global-energy-completes-phase-one-of-7500-
hectare-jatropa-project-in-ethiopia, and www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2007/Nov/05Nov07/38570.
htm)
BHO Agro (India), 2010
27,000 ha. in Gambella Region, for biofuel production.
Source: The Oakland Institute, 2011, p. 2.
Ardent Energy Group (USA), 2009
15,000 ha. for biofuel production (jatropha and castor bean), active since 2009. They
announced an agreement with United National Petroleum of Addis Ababa on 17 July 2009
for the distribution of biodiesel in Ethiopia.
(Source: www.prweb.com/releases/2009/05/prweb2468304.htm; and www.prweb.com/releases/
2009/07/prweb2648314.htm).
Emami Biotech (India), 2009
30,000 ha., used for jatropha production in Oromiya Region.
Source: The Oakland Institute, 2011, p. 2.
Sun Biofuels (UK), 2006
a) 5000 ha. in Mancha, Wolaitta, Southern Region, for the producton of biofuels.
b) 80,000 ha. for a jatropha plantation in Metekkel Zone, Benishangul-Gumuz Region, under
a lease for 50 years at a price of 25 birr/ha. Sun Biofuels Ethiopia has a share of 80% in the
Ethiopian National Biodiesel Corporation.
(Source: Tibebwa and Negusu 2008, 54; The Oakland Institute 2011, 2).
I.D.C. Investment (Denmark), 2007
15,000 ha. in Asossa, Benishangul-Gumuz Region, for biofuel production.
Source: The Oakland Institute, 2011, p. 2.
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